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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a general model of the process by 
which large organizations develop information technology over long periods of time. 
A special focus of the paper conerns the question how "social impacts of computers" 
are produced by management decisions, organizational exigencies, accidents, and 
environmental forces. 
The model is clearly situated in the broader behavioral literature on 
organizations and organizational innovation. Major streams of behavioral research 
and assumptions are reviewed. The model assumes an eclectic position: 
organizational innovation results from both internal institutional factors as well as 
powerful environmentaIforces. "Social impacts of computers" filter out from a 
reasonably complex interaction between the organization and the environment. 
Our goal from the outset was to develop a general model of 
information technology development which was not a "special" purpose, narrowly 
framed theory typical of prior management information system research. In 
addition, we hope to set straight popular misconceptions created by vendors, 
consultants, and others concerning the question, how do computers "impact" 
organizations. 
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A General Model for Understanding the Relationship 
Between Information Technology and Organizations 
The origins of this paper lie in a very practical research problem: how is it 
possible to understand the experience of very large organizations in building truly 
large infomation system overly long periods of time? In 1985 my colleague Alan 
Westin (Columbia University), and I began a study of the Social Security 
Administration's (SSA) billion dollar system project called the System 
Modernization Plan (hereafter SMP). This project was intended to re-build SSA's 
very large scale system developed since 1935. 
The study was funded by the Office of Technology Assessment which is a 
research arm of the United States Congress. In this instance, several Congressional 
Committees wanted a professional assessment of whether or not SSRs plan to 
rebuild its aging information system stood any chance of actually working. By 1985, 
SSA has spent about 250 million dollars appropriated by Congress. There was by 
1985 plenty of evidence that this money had not been well spent. By 1986 we had 
developed a preliminary general model of information technology innovation and 
completed our research for OTA 
Our theoretical work was spurred, and supported, by a grant from the 
National Science Foundation to do a comparative study of the evolution since 1940 
of information processing at three federal agencies using our model (NSF Grant 
IRI-8619301). The agencies are the FBI, IRS, and SSA. This work is on-going. 
Very Large Scale Systems: SSA's SMP Plan 
In 1982 when it began, SSA's System Modernization Plan (SMP) was one of 
the largest and most complex American examples of planned organizational change 
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and innovation in the 1980's. SSNs SMP is an example of a class of information 
systems we call very l q e  scale system (VLSS). Described in greater detail in a 
different paper, very large scale systems--briefly--evolve over long periods of time, 
control the information flow of the central, "core", activities of an organization, and 
play a dorninant role in shaping the organizational metaphor of production and 
service delivery. Much of what large scale organizations do on a day-to-day basis is 
shaped by the capabilities, design strategies, and performance of its large scale 
systems hardware and software. 
While the private sector undertakes large system development efforts, none 
in the 1980's had as large a budget or staff as the S M P ,  or involved so many clients. 
Since 1982, several other federal agencies have announced re-building plans of 
equal or greater size. 
Like SMP, many of these other federal system re-building projects are 
experiencing great difficulties: cost overruns, failures of software, delays in delivery, 
and outright fraud. Systems of this magnitude rarely "fail" like airplanes falling out 
of the sky. Instead large scale information systems have "soft", unplanned landings 
in which major parts fail, planned changes in design never occur, hardware is in 
place but underused, and so forth. 
What is a 'General Model' 
From the beginning of our work we set out to develop a general model of 
information systems innovation-- a model which was not peculiar to information 
systems technology but instead one which might be applied to any organizational 
innovation, a model which was directly related to the mainstreams of research in 
organizational sociology, political science, social psychology, economics, and other 
behavioral disciplines. 
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Our view was that the information systems research world was too isolated 
from the rest of behavioral research, had developed several unique theoretical 
perspectives and so-called "fi-ameworks" based on the assumption that information 
technology was somehow different from other technologies or innovations. The 
findings of this circumscribed worldview of inkmation systems (sometimes called 
"management information systems") research were, in our view, of limited 
generality. 
By "general" therefore we mean a model which relates information 
technology innovation and use to the broader context of organizations and the 
organizational literature. 
Our use of terms like paradigm, model, theory, and hypothesis are standard 
and fit within the framework of "normal science". A model is more developed than 
aparadigm, but not quite a theory. 
A paradigm is a set of underlying often taken for granted assumptions about 
the nature of problems, causality, and consequences. These assumptions spawn 
models which are particular arrangements of concepts and variables suggested by a 
paradigm. Theories are testable collections of tightly formulated hypotheses of the 
form "the more X, the more y".l 
We had three pressing, practical uses for a general model. Before we 
could understand the development trajectory of SMP, and later of other large scale 
systems, their successes and failures, we needed a model to organize our 
observations. Before we could develop this model we needed a good understanding 
of why organizations innovate in the first place and how they go about doing it. And 
before we could seriously address organizational innovation, we felt we needed 
some powerful insights into organizational behavior in general. In addition, we 
needed a framework to organize our search of the literature. 
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We hoped our model would meet four criteria: utility, simplicity, generality, 
and provocativeness. The model had to be powerful enough to do a creditable job 
of organizing the literature; general in the sense described above; simple in order to 
present preliminary findings to general managers and lay people, as well as 
academics; and provocative of further thinking about the subject, e.g., hypothesis 
generation. 
These initial perspectives gave us the task of reviewing the organizational 
imovation literature--a massive job in itself, axid then searching for some 
overarching organizational behavior perspective which could place imovation in the 
context of general organizational behavior. Once we had this perspective we hoped ~ 
we could organize the literature review in a coherent fashion. 
In order to answer these inter-related questions we reviewed three major 
streams of empirical literature: organizational innovation and change (a truly 
massive literature), technology implementation, and technology assessment. The 
disciplines involved in these literatures are diverse: political science, sociology, 
economics, law and public policy, history, systems analysis and design. We have 
included many references to this literature, but the reader interested in a more 
detailed description should consult the comprehensive re vie^.^ There are several 
classic reviews of organizational innovation as well. 3 
In addition to the literature review, the authors have over thirty years of 
collective experience working with large scale system development projects. 
Outline of the Paper 
What follows is divided into five sections. Because the practical research 
setting had a lot to do with theoretical development, Section 1 describes briefly the 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89- 11 
practical situation of the Social Security Administration in 1982 at the outset of the 
SMP from a Deputy Com.missionerYs point of view. Section 2 introduces the major 
theoretical assumptions and propositions of the model. In addition we introduce a 
rough outline of the model so the reader can anticipate the conclusion. Sections 3 
and 4 describe and review directly related literature on organizational behavior and 
innovation which we used to specify and operationalize the model. Section 5 
presents a s m a r y  of the model, how it is used in our research, as well as some 
limitations. 
I. From a Deputy Commissioner's Point of View: The Practical Research Setting 
One way to see the utility of developing a model of IT innovation is to 
consider the plight of a recently appointed Deputy Codss ioner  of Systems. Any 
model of innovation should, we believe, be able to provide guidelines and useful 
strategies to a senior manager. We can evaluate our model, and various 
perspectives in the literature, against the practical considerations of a Deputy 
Commissioner of System at SSA. But first you should have a basic understanding 
of what SSA is and how it operates. 
SSA: The Organization 
The Social Security Administration was created by Congress in 1935 with the 
passage of the Social Security Act. The first old age insurance account numbers 
were issued in 1937, the first year's budget was one million dollars, and the first 
payments began in 1942. Since then SSA has grown into the largest insurance 
agency in the world with approximately 50 million monthly recipients. From the 
beginning in the 1930's through the 1960's SSA was one of the most advanced users 
of information technology in the world. 
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Today SSA is an organization with 70,000 employees. SSA operates 1300 
district and branch offices throughout the country, 10 regional offices, 75 area 
offices, 34 teleservice centers, 3 data operations centers, and 7 program service 
centers. SSA also oversees 54 state Disability Determination Services centers. 
SSA remains highly centralized at its Baltimore headquarters where 20,000 
employees are located, including 4000 systems personnel at the National Data 
Center. 
There are four major programs at SSA: OAS (Old Age Survivors), DI 
(Disability Insurance), Enumeration (distributing SSA numbers to the population), 
and SSI (Supplemental Security Income). In addition SSA administers a small 
program called Black Lung which provides disability payments to coal mine 
workers. 
From a political point of view, it is important to remember that SSA was the 
flagship of the New Deal, the single largest federal intervention program devised by 
Roosevelt to help re-generate the American economy in the late 1930's. 
Conservatives in the 1930's denounced it as puie socialism. Throughout the 
conservative 1980's, SSA was often on the defensive at the White House and in 
conservative journals. 
The Deputy Commissioner of Systems 
As an experiment, assume that you have just been appointed Acting Deputy 
Commissioner of Systems at SSA. Deputy Commissioners are key players in senior 
management. SSA is divided into five major divisions or functional areas (see 
diagram) each led by a Deputy Commissioner. The Acting Commissioner of the 
agency has selected you to plan and implement the Systems Modernization Plan. 
You are now in charge of a billion dollar project to re-build SSA's old systems and 
you control as well the entire systems staff and'budget (4,000 systems personnel and 
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a budget of about 150 to 200 million dollars per year for all expenses related to 
information processing). 
The year is 1982 and the agency has barely survived a major funding crisis in 
the conservative Reagan administration. The old administrative systems are totally 
saturated and no longer capable of any growth. The delivery of checks to 50 million 
persons each month is seriously in doubt. Computers and telecommunications are 
twenty years out of date, much of it no longer manufactured, and operating beyond 
capacity. 
Although survival of the agency appears certain, the President continues to 
show his displeasure with SSA by refusing to appoint a permanent Commissioner, 
or to approve any senior level, permanent, appointments including your own. Your 
real title is "Acting" Commissioner of Systems, with all the limitations implied. 
With more than 20 years of agency experience, you begin to think about the 
task ahead. At one billion dollars, SMP is one of the largest civilian agency system 
development efforts ever. It would be a difficult task in any agency, indeed, any 
organization. No private sector business has so many clients, such a large data 
processing installation, or is so geographically dispersed. 
SSA in the past developed systems over decades, piecemeal. Each of the 
major SSA programs described above (Old Age Survivors, Disability, Enumeration, 
Supplemental Security Income, and Black Lung) has its own set of information 
systems developed in isolation from the rest. As Congress passed new programs, 
SSA developed systems to achieve the legislated goals. That of course is part of the 
problem: SSA uses 12 million lines of code written by hundreds of different 
programmers and analysts over decades. Systems people call it "spaghetti codeM-- 
the lines of code are all related but in ways that are twisted, complex, and non- 
linear. The totality is like a major orchestra playing a symphony with many 
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different composers. The only way music can come out is through Herculean 
individual and group efforts. 
The systems staff available to design and build SMP has years of agency 
experience, but is woefdIy behind in modem software techniques, lacks equipment, 
and often must be dragged into the maintenance of existing programs and systems 
just to keep SSA working. There is very little extra, trained staff to develop the new 
systems. Federal wages are low relative to private sector wages and attracting new, 
college educated, systems personnel is difficult. 
In terms of computing power, telecommunications, data storage, procedures 
design and business practices--the agency is a full computing generation behind (five 
to ten years). 
SSA's Systems employees fear SMP wili reduce their power and discretion. 
They fear any changes will mean the end of their jobs. The union to which they 
belong (the American Federation of Government Employees) has threatened to 
stall SMP unless working conditions and jobs are jointly determined. Labor 
relations are deteriorating because of job cuts, RIFS (reductions in force), and wage 
freezes. Without labor support, SMP is doomed. Modern systems like SMP will 
require re-training many of SSA's 80,000 employees. Without their voluntary 
cooperation, even enthusiastic participation, the project can stall for years. 
The Reagan administration just fired striking aircraft controllers (1982) and 
is seeking to ban their union. The labor movement perceives the new 
Administration as an enemy. Simply talking with SSA's union--probably vital to the 
success of SMP--will be difficult in this atmosphere. 
SMP will change how clients are served at 1300 district offices, permit new 
management information on district office performance to flow quickly to 
headquarters, challenge the discretion of the appointed Regional Commissioners 
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(indeed call into question the need for District Commissioners), potentially call into 
question the need for over 100 million physical file folders stored in the regions. 
These aspects of SMP fly in the face of SSA's organizational culture. Many 
of SSA's services could be delivered through a-system like an air line reservations 
system, or through automatic teller machines. But the bureaucratic ideology of SSA 
from the beginning has been face-to-face client service based on a one-to-one 
relationship with a professional caseworker using a physical file. This mode of 
operation may no longer be economically viable, or technologically necessary. In 
the 1930's it was both. 
As Deputy Commissioner of Systems you know that much more than a selling 
job will be required to implement SMP. You will have to show the various interest 
groups in the agency--the systems operations people, the case workers, the regional 
commissioners, the union, the middle managers--that SMP is in their interest, that it 
is necessary for agency survival, that despite all the promised changes S M P  will not 
harm them personally. You will have to convhce them that SMP should be seen as 
a personally empowering program which will let them do their jobs better and not as 
a system imposed from on top designed to reduce jobs, cut wages, worsen working 
conditions, and monitor every worker. 
At the same time, the President's men at OMB (the Office of Management 
and Budget) are pressuring the agency to come up with some large staff reductions. 
OMB figures that with one billion dollars in new technology, some labor savings--say 
a 25% reduction in staff, or 20,000 employees-- are reasonable. Is this a reasonable 
demand? Should advanced computerized systems lead to labor force reductions at 
the same time that service is enhanced? 
You also know after years in the agency that you don't control all the pieces. 
No matter how well you plan, no matter how hard you try to build confidence in 
SMP, events, other actors, and individuals intervene. The President may call for 
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federal job cuts and use technology as a political weapon to support cuts. SSA may 
be a target for the President just because it is big. Congress may listen to the 
President this time, and they certainly will demand better service to their 
constituents. 
The AARP (American Association of Retired Persons) will pull out all the 
stops to prevent labor force reductions fearing loss of service to their constituents; 
the unions will join them. Without AARP's support, Congress may not fund SMP. 
Unplanned disasters--the breakdown of a major mainframe, or a strike in a regional 
check processing center--are always possible. 
At best you can influence the process, intercede only at strong points, weaken 
the opposition where possible, deflect counter proposals, tilt the debate in your 
direction, and hope for the best. Maybe all you can do is set a general direction 
rather than implement a plan. 
After reviewing all the pressures and limits on an Acting Deputy 
Commissioner of Systems, the reader might wonder why take the job? Setting aside 
that question, if you were in this job yourself a model of how organizations change, a 
model of the major factors in information technology implementation, might be 
very helpful and practical for you if it could be'used to develop a management plan 
of action. Where should the Commissioner start, what should he pay most 
attention to, and how should he order his priorities? 
Section 2 Theoretical Assumptions and Perspectives 
An Emerging Paradigm 
Our theoretical argument begins with the proposition that over the last 15 
years of research on the social impact of computers, a rough paradigm of analysis 
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and thinking has developed among an invisible college of researchers. This is 
remarkable given the diverse backgrounds of the researchers: computer science, 
political science, sociology, public administration, and other behavioral disciplines. 
There are four central assumptions in this emerging paradigm: 
*The environment of an organization is an important factor in the development of it 
systems. 
*Internal organizational factors such as politics, bureaucracy, and culture shape the 
evolution of systems in an organization over long periods of time . 
*Information technology is a malleable set of tools which can and does reflect 
organizational features rather than shape organizational features. 
*The systems development process is a long term process involving adoption, 
utilization, routinization, and management. . 
*Information technology, computers, rarely have direct "impacts" on organizations 
or people. "Impacts" are complex outcomes involving interactions among 
organizational and technological factors. 
Evidence for this paradigm can be found in early work (Laudon, 1974; Kling, 1978; 
Laudon, 1976; Kling 1980; Danizger, Dutton, mng,  and Kraemer, 1982) which 
proffered crude but innovative frameworks for viewing information technology. 
More explicit development of key elements of the paradigm can be found in later 
work (Markus, 1983; Robey and Markus, 1984: ). Explicit recognition of the 
paradigm and testable theory can be found in Laudon (1985; 1986), and a major 
forthcoming book by Kraemer and King (1989). 
Popular Conceptions of fiibw Computers Impact Organizations 
An interesting feature of this paradigm is that it runs directly counter to 
popular conceptions of the social and organizational impacts of computing. In the 
popular view, information technology, computers, directly impact participants. 
Computers in this popular view "flatten hierarchies," "create new organizational 
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forms," "revolutionize the educational process," or as Forbes magazine put it in an 
advertisement, computers are "utterly transforming the economy and society." 
None of the empirical research conducted in the last fifteen years by 
researchers in the tradition described above supports these popular views in which 
computers have direct impacts on organizational process, structure, activities, or 
management. It is as if high placed journalists, pundits, advertisement copy writers, 
salespeople, Washington lobbyists, and a few academics have chosen to totally 
ignore a large body of empirical research which runs contrary to mass opinion. 
Re-discovering Internal and External Dimensions of Behavior: A Preliminary Mode2 
As we reviewed the innovation and general organizational behavior 
literature, we re-discovered the ancient distinction between internal and external 
sources of behavior. This distinction is at least as old as Aristotle's Politics where it 
is used to describe how the various states and societies in the Greek empire e v o l ~ e . ~  
As noted above, with little formal notice scholars have turned to the external 
environment of organizations for one source of iduence over computer projects. 
The distinction is tangentially related to the ancient and perennial debate of 
free will versus determinism which shapes so much of Western culture. It is used as 
4 well in a fine review of organizational theory by Pfeffer, and it is an elementary 
distinction in development economics (exogenous and endogenous stimulants). 
In this view, organizations can be seen as behaving in response to external, 
environmental pressures and opportunities, or they can be seen as behaving in 
response to internal forces. The distinction between institutional and environmental 
factors bears some resemblance to that of voluhtarism and determinism. In general, 
institutional factors are those over which the organization has some influence or even 
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control. And environmentalfactors in general are beyond direct organizational 
control. 
The institutional versus environmental perspective supplied us with the 
overarching, general theoretical perspective from which to describe, and categorize 
the voluminous innovation literature. 
Applied to innovation -just another kind of organizational behavior - we 
reasoned that organizations innovate for basically two reasons. Either the 
organization innovates because of internal (institutional) factors or because of 
stimulation from external (environmental) factors largely beyond its control5. To 
simpm matters we will use institutional and environmental throughout the paper. 
Applied to information systems specifically, our preliminary view was that 
external and internal factors determine an organization's major missions and 
policies. These missions and policies in turn determine the kinds of information 
systems that are built, and the kinds of implementation strategies pursued. 
Ultimately, the impact of information systems on organizations, and vica versa, the 
impact of organizations on systems, result from this process. 
The preliminary model is illustrated in Figure 1. Once we had arrived at this 
preliminary model, we began the process of specifymg more precisely what we 
meant by "external'' and "internal" factors, "missions and policies", "implementation 
strategies" and so forth. This led us to a more fine grained literature review in 
search of more specific concepts, and operational measures. 
The Preliminary Model at SSA 
As we explored the preliminary model, we attempted often to see how it 
worked expIaining SSA's own behavior. We had conducted many interviews with 
SSA senior managers, systems and other unionized employees, as well as vendors, 
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commentators, and auditors of SSA activities, prior to developing the theory as we 
put together a history of information technology at the agency from 1935 to 1985. 
Our interviews showed that the major external factors operating on SSA, at 
times forcing innovation, are other political actors in Congress and the White House 
who control the agency's budget, mission, policies, and other resources. In addition, 
a fast changing technology created by others, and used by competing organizations 
(private insurance companies), also is a major feature of the environment. As an 
insurance agency, and a welfare agency, SSA is also powerfully affected by 
environmental demographic change. 
The major internal factors at SSA are the politics, bureaucracy, culture, 
plans, and accidents, e.g. random events, found in all large organizations. 
Together these environmental and institutional forces could be seen as the 
driving forces behind all of SSA's behavior, including SMP and technology 
innovation. With this preliminary support for the utility of the distinction between 
environmental and institutional factors in innovation, we began a detailed review of 
the literature. 
Other Major Assumptions 
We began our research with a number of background assumptions based on 
the literature and our own experience. 
Our research had taught us not all innovations are equd As Schurnpeter 
noted, some innovations radically alter the production function of organizations--or 
threaten to do so, whereas many other innovations impact only technical areas of 
the organization ti SSXs SMP is a non-routine, risky, very large scale innovation 
which--if it was successful--might alter the production function at SSA along with 
many fundamental assumptions about how SSA conducts business. Given the size 
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of the innovation, virtually all of SSA's internal and external political actors would 
be active players. 
Technology is more than hardware and information technology in particular 
involves m a q  social technologies, e.g., skills, attitudes, management organization, 
and beliefs. Important technology innovation is a "package" which normalIy cannot 
simply be "adopted like electric pencil sharpeners7. Implementing, routinizing, 
changing people, work, and organizations may be required before new information 
technology can work properly. 
While the classical literature on innovation speaks of "adoptiontt, the last 
twenty years of research on innovation has clearly found that innovation is aprocess 
not an event. Following simple adoption comes utilization, long term routinization, 
and proper management 8. In the last twenty years many institutions have seen 
technology adopted, but then not utilized, or routinized, and finally abandoned. 
SSA's SMP is a ten year innovation process, not a one-shot adoption. 
We also knew that scale of innovation is very important in understanding 
innovation in organizations. Whereas we can use the metaphor of "adoption" and 
"diffusion" when speaking of individuals and small groups, as the scale of innovation 
goes from individuals and small groups to organizations, and then institutions, the 
explanatory framework must enlarge. SSA's SMP is a large scale, macro case study 
where broad social, political, and cultural features are important. 
After many years of experience we discovered that technology is not strictly 
an independent force and that technology does not impact organizations like some 
extraterrestrial craft. Technology--information technology--is a product of some 
organization, some design decisions. A system designed by IBM will be quite 
different in "impacts" than a system designed by Apple Computer Corporation for 
the same purpose. Moreover, organizations always modify technologies to fit local 
circumstances. Hence researchers can never really study a "pure" instance of the 
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technology, information technology sui generis, for it is always confounded with 
local variations, and distant design decisions. Technology is a social product. 
Last, we are well aware of the dissimilarities between the pubic and private 
sector (and aware of their similarities). Briefly, public government organizations 
operate in a political marketplace, insulated somewhat from the economic 
marketplace; they are constrained and prodded by political forces, statutes, 
regulations, and Constitutional principles. It is generally agreed that government 
agencies and non-profit organizations have a restricted range of potential strategic 
options when faced with declining  environment^.^ Government agencies are 
also players in the political marketplace, not merely reactant to political forces. In 
some sense they shape their own. political environment, have some choice which 
environments to play in, and what tactics to use, although to a smaller degree than 
private organizations. 
Section 3 The Innovation Literature: Two Perspectives on Social Action 
In the last thirty years there has been a marked change in the innovation 
literature. Work done in the 1940's and 1950's tends to emphasize individual actors, 
roles, social networks, and personal attitudes as central to organizational innovation. 
Work done in the 1960's tends to emphasize the centrality of institutional 
characteristics in the change process, 
This work from the 1940's to the 1960's has a decidedly up-beat, optimistic 
character to it. The message is that organizational innovation is possible and likely 
if people would just get the right attitudes, the right values, cooperate, and pull 
together. 
The work of the 1970's and 80's tends to focus much more on the broad 
social, political, and cultural environment in which organizations live. Here 
environmental pressures are seen as dominant, change is less under control of the 
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organization, environmental change can be rapid and threatening, and many 
organizations would rather die than change.10 This work is not so optimistic. 
Organizational innovation in this recent work often comes about by old 
organizations dying and new ones springing up. 
Some institutional factors found important to the innovation process are 
political competition among organizational leaders, bureaucratic opposition or 
support for change, and deep seated organizational values. Some environmental 
factors important to innovation are social and political climate, demand for an 
organization's product, technological change, and support from other organizations. 
Some of the literature--as we see below--focuses on the interaction 
between these factors. This literature reflects the idea that organizations can shape 
their environments some times. 11 
Institutional and Environmental Models 
We can use the basic distinction developed above to arrange all of the 
innovation literature into two basic groups: institutional and environmental models. 
Environmental models focus on uncertainties or opportunities in the 
environment that organizations must either cope with or take advantage of through 
organizational innovation. Failure to do so results in organizational decline and 
death. Rapid environmental change, loss of legitimacy, growing competition, 
changing client or customer preferences, demographic change, and the like are 
examples of environmental uncertainties. Environmental opportunities--though less 
frequently cited--are exemplified by new technologies, declining costs, market 
expansion, a baby booma new government program which promises funding, and 
etc. 
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In environmental models organizations innovate because either they are 
forced to by the environment or they choose to take advantage of some 
environmental opportunity. The environment is,in any event, the principal stimulus. 
Institutional models of change focus on internal decision making and 
planning, organizational values, norms, structural characteristics, bureaucratic and 
political processes, and human resources. Organizations in this view adopt 
innovations because they happen to have the right structural characteristics (or 
planned them in the first place), because they have supportive innovative values, 
because of the outcome of political and bureaucratic intrigues, or because of the 
happenstance connection of problem with the right solutions. 
According to some institutional models, organizations can innovate despite 
the absence of any environmental stimulus, and without any underlying contribution 
to "efficiency" or "effectiveness". 
Uplifring and Dkpiriting Aspects 
Institutional models of change are generally uplifting because they 
emphasize the volitional, planned nature of change. Organizations in this view can 
choose, manage, change, make progress, survive, and in the long run adapt to 
environmental change. 
Environmental models are often dispiriting because they tend to emphasize 
the rapidity and harshness of environmental change, turbulence--abrupt change that 
is not planned, the brittle nature of organizations, the absence of change, the 
likelihood that managers will misperceive their environments, the dependence of 
actors on circumstances beyond their control, and the ultirnate death of most 
organizations. 
By far the vast amount of research on organizational change focuses on 
institutional models which emphasize volition, management, and planned change. 
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Almost all schools of management, both business schools and public administration, 
teach that organizations can successfully adapt to environments if "the right policies" 
are adopted. The literature which focuses on "implementation" of innovations fits 
this mold l2 
In these management schools and their related literature, failure is treated as 
an aberration, something to be avoided, something not talked about at any great 
length. Organizational death, like personal death and dying, is in general a pariah 
subject even in a market society which presumably counts on inefficient forms 
disappearing. 
With the literature classified into institutional and environmental camps, we 
can briefly review the major themes in the innovation literature. At appropriate 
points in the review, we pause to consider how a Deputy Commissioner of Systems 
might react to the research literature. 
Section 4: Institutional Models and Perspectives on Organizational Innovation 
In an effort to further speclfy and operationalize our preliminary model of 
innovation, we examine briefly the seven leading institutional models of 
organizational innovation. 
Rational Organizations and Decisionmaking 
The most pervasive explanation of organizational innovation is the rational 
adaptation theory. Here, managers perceive gaps between performance and 
expectations, search for solutions, choose optimizing or satisfying solutions, and 
bring the organization into a desired relationship with the environment. 
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Organizations innovate then because they want to achieve certain goals, 
because they accurately perceive gaps between performance and goals. 
How do organization's innovate? The 'rational man7 model of 
decisionmaking is employed here at the organizational level: the organization has 
more or less perfect information, a clear set of consistent goals, the resources to 
investigate all alternatives, and the ability to rationally optimize choices.13 
The environment is generally a supportive tableau. While environments 
change, organizations adapt in the long run to these changes.14 There are many 
variations on the rational model most of which try to make it more realistic.15 
In the business school field called 'management information system' (MIS) 
the rational model is the basis of virtually all textbooks.16 Managers are taught to 
scan the environment for technologies, experiment and learn; adopt and implement 
what benefits the organization. l7 
A special literature called "implementation" argues that if an organization 
develops the correct roles, adopts the right strategies, and avoids risky technology 
projects, then success will follow18. 
Business authors and consultants with up-beat messages (captured in titles 
such as Thriving on Chaos) sell millions of copies to business leaders with the idea 
that organizations can survive changing environments if the "right" strategy is 
followed. l9 
Even critics of information technology adopt a rational model. For Marxists, 
capitalist organizations adopt IT because of "the drive to coordinate diversity. . . 
greater economy, and [efforts] to rationalize the organization" 20. Another critic 
sees the technology itself autonomously rationalizing organizations "largely without 
human guidance"-21 
There is some limited empirical research which supports the rational model. 
Sometimes things happen as planned just by virtue of dumb luck. Adoption of 
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criminal justice information systems have, for instance, been linked with the rise in 
crime rates (and lots of federal cash) 22 and Gother study found perceptions of 
"improved organizational performance" resulted from the spread of IT among local 
governments (even though the actual benefits did not occur)-23 
As we review other perspectives, however, it will be apparent that the 
rational model of system development is most unlikely as a description of what 
actually happens in organizations. 
Evolutionary and Stage Models 
A widespread and popular variation on the rational model of innovation 
argues that organizations "naturally" go through stages or evolve. Many of the social 
science classics written by Marx, Compte, Spencer, Weber, Durkheim and others 
argue some form of inevitable change caused by some deeply held, simple but 
powerful internal values in organizations --the pursuit of efficiency, profits, control, 
knowledge, modernity-- and pushed along usually by some contemporary deus ex 
machina (advancing knowledge, falling wages, or competition). 
Contemporary versions of evolutionary models are provided by Daniel Bell 
(the "post industrial society"), John Kenneth Galbraith's (the "new industrial state"), 
and Marc Porat's (the "information society"). 
In these theories society and organizations evolve always and inevitably 
towards some higher state, pushed by advancing knowledge or--in some theories-- 
information technology. Organizations innovate because they vigorously pursue 
some goal, and adopt whatever is needed to achieve that goal. Organizations adapt 
to the zeitgeist or whatever else is moving history. 
These theories are wonderfully simple, make for fun reading, excellent 
dinner party debates (are we really advancing?) and serious conversation in 
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academe (what is the meaning of 'progress7). Unfortunately, all have been seriously 
challenged and most repudiated as utter intellectual nonsense. 24 
There are of course special versions of evolutionary models in information 
technology (MIS) literature. The most famous is the Nolan stage theory which 
claims organizations go through four stages of IT: initiation, contagion, control, and 
i n t e g r a t i ~ n ~ ~ .  Allegedly, one can discover these stages by looking at budgeting 
levels and change in an organization. 
Stage models are the ideal consultant's magic talisman for which the client 
pays dearly. By claiming all organizations go through stages of information 
technology development, the consultant then poses the question "what stage is your 
organization in?" followed by "what stage should your organization be in?".26 The 
answers always are expensive. 
Stage theories are rational insofar as they rely on more or less conscious 
organizational, decisions, as the mechanism of evolution, or on criterion of 
organizational efficiency to push the model along. 
None of the information technology evolutionary models are supported by 
empirical data and all have been roundly criticized. 27 Many organizations skip 
stages altogether 28, budgeting for computers (one indicator of a new stage in 
computing is a new budgetary level of spending for IT) tends to be a relatively 
constant percentage of gross revenues. 29 And all evolutionary theories posited so 
far have a teleological bias: there is a single, benevolent end stage towards which all 
organizations are moving. The possibility of organizations freezing at one stage, or 
jumping a stage ahead, or adapting the wrong model, or just failing altogether, is 
not a part of the consultant's evolutionary forecast. 
Strategic Planning, and the Strategic Role of Systems 
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It is a short extension from the descriptive 'rational model' where 
organizational behavior is shaped by rational decisionmaking, to the prescription 
that organizations shouM engage in rational strategic planning. Strategic planning -- 
although accounts differ--basically involves carefully investigating the nature of the 
business and industry for long term growth potential, establishing corporate 
objectives, examining alternative strategies to achieve the objectives, 
operationalizing goals, assigning responsibility for implementation, and evaluating 
progress towards the goals. 30 
Ln short, strategic planning literature a s h  organizations to act like the 
rational model says they should. The emphasis is on formal planning staffs who 
churn out five year plans, and coordinate implementation of the plan. 
In the strategic literature, organizations innovate because of a strategic plan 
which resulted from a rational decisionmaking process. Implementation of the 
innovation is carried out by a trained professional staff which guides and monitors 
innovation. 
There are of course many different recipes for how to do strategic planning-- 
some recommend top down planning by top level senior management, others 
bottom-up, still others "middle out"; and several authors are now recommending 
strategic planning in reverse--look at the available means before considering 
desirable goals?1 
Pushed along by a fascination with measurement tools and planning 
techniques, Erom systems analysis to budgeting techniques (PPBS, zero based 
budgeting, etc.), American firms widely adopted corporate strategic planning in the 
1960's and 1970's. They have just as widely abandoned corporate wide formal 
strategic planning in the 1980's. Evidence has slowly accumulated that strategic 
planning created a huge, bloated corporate headquarters staff which fed senior 
management an endless stream of data and documents; the resulting decisions often 
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were disastrous?2 The return on equity--or other measures of performance--for 
firms which engage in strategic planning is no greater than that of finns which do 
not follow formal strategic planning  method^?^ 
In the words of one corporate planning guru who examined corporate 
acquisitions over a thirty year period, 'The corporate strategies of most companies 
have dissipated instead of created shareholder value."34 
Just as corporate wide strategic planning was falling into disrepute, the major 
themes were picked up by the information technology literature in the mid 1980's. 
A host of speculative articles appeared all of which argued the vital strategic role 
which information technology could (should) play in the 
As applied to information technology, the strategic argument is that 
information technology can be used to achieve. a more or less permanent 
competitive advantage over other £irms by reducing costs of production or 
differentiating the product or service. Information technology, according to 
proponents, can be used to create new relationships with suppliers, employees, 
customers, and competitors. When successful, it is argued that a firm can use 
information technology to raise market entry barriers, decrease the possibility of 
substitute products, and increase the firms power over suppliers and buyers. A 
common example in the literature is the American Airlines reservation system, 
SABW, which has over the years provided American with a powerful competitive 
advantage. 
To date, there is no evidence that firms can systematically, over the long run, 
consciously use information technology to achieve long term competitive advantage. 
Virtually all successful "strategic systems" in existence today were drifted into over 
many years, evolved through several stages, and were not planned. Competitive 
advantages appear short lived. So-called successful strategic system--the airline 
reservation system, American Hospital Supply Corporation, Citibank's ATM 
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network--are constantly cited in the literature. These systems however often 
evolved rather casually, without any central plan, and provoked powerful 
competitive responses. The strategic literature fails to account for the strategic 
system failures like IBM's and Merrill Lynch's failed stock quotation system, 
Federal Fxpress' ZAP MAIL, Citibank's failure to increase return on equity despite 
massive investments in ATM machines, and General Motor's failure to achieve cost 
advantages in auto production despite truly huge investments in robotics [GM's 
most productive plant is in Torrance California and does not use robots. Instead it is 
managed by Japanese from Toyota in a joint venture]. 
The Deputy Commissioner Responds 
The Acting Deputy Commissioner--listening to our description of the 
rational model--would no doubt be shaking his head in disbelief at this point. The 
rational models--classical, evolutionary, and strategic planning--seem totally 
unrealistic. There clearly is not time, resources, or staff to consider all possible 
alternative actions; there is no rational calculus to help choose the "best" option 
Pest according to whom and what?]; there is no consensus on gods among key 
players; information is not perfect or even shared. 
Evolutionary models sound nice--but it is not clear what stage SSA is in. SSA 
may be unique. Information technology affairs in general at SSA, perhaps the entire 
administrative apparatus, seem to be evolving downwards, not upwards towards 
some perfect future brought on automatically by advancing technology. 
Strategic planning approaches offer some provocative thoughts. SSA's SMP 
is a strategic plan. But is SMP the right plan, can it be implemented, and will the 
changes be accepted? How can SSA use information technology to change the 
relationship with clients--100 million contributors and 50 million beneficiaries? 
Would any change in relationship be accepted? SSA has experienced several 
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strategic planning failures in the 1970's, top down efforts that had little support from 
the middle management or the 80,000 other SSA workers. SSA is not exactly free to 
choose what industry it wants to be in, or even how it delivers services. Constituents 
have Congressmen, and Congressmen sign the check. Would the union and other 
workers accept massive changes in how SSA accomplishes its work? 
W e  rational models offer the Deputy Commissioner few practical 
solutions or action guides, the Commissioner does recognize that whatever plan is 
decided upon, for whatever reasons, it will have to be presented to the public, to 
Congress and the President, as  the result of a rational strategic planning process. 
Here lies the strength of rational models--as an explanation and supportive 
rationale of behavior derived from fundamentally other considerations. 
Political Pempectives 
Political scientists, public administration specialists, and sociologists have 
often studied the politics of innovation. Here innovations are adopted, used, and 
managed, as a result of a political bargain struck among key organizational actors. 
The result is not necessarily "rational" in the sense of "best, optimal decision." The 
result is, however, "rational" in the sense of producing results which key actors can 
live with. The test of a good innovation or change is: can people live with it, can 
people in the organization (and key external groups) support the policy, and 
therefore can the organization survive? 
Why do organizations innovate? In the political literature organizations 
innovate when it is politically necessary because of external environmental demands 
or internal power struggles. Classical "rational optimal" solutions and those who 
advocate them are potentially dangerous because they lead to results which may be 
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scientifically rational but politically unacceptable and potentially threatening to the 
organization. 
Political models of systems innovation assume that organizations are 
composed of interest groups, and political actors who either represent themselves 
(their personal interests) and/or the interests of groups. Politics arises because of 
limited resources and the desire of most actors for more--more of whatever is worth 
having: money, power, status, and affection. Politics also arises because of deep and 
basic social divisions created by the division of labor, specialization, and history. 
Power in organizations is shared; at the top are men and women who differ in points 
of view; these differences matter. Competition for leadership results; each 
individual in an organization--from the high and mighty to the floorsweeps--are 
players in the game of politics. Decision making is the outcome of daily political 
competition. 36 
How do organizations innovate? Innovation results from the strategies and 
tactics of key political actors, roles, and groups.37 Innovation is a process, a 
struggle, not an event that happens at some time or place. An important aspect of 
the political model is that organizations to do not "decide" about systems. Instead, 
systems development is from the inception to the end a negotiating process 
involving major groups in the organization. Outcomes of the negotiation tend to 
reflect the power of the parties involved although there can be surprises, 
countervailing values, and unintended consequences to the game of politics.38 
Moreover, not all actors correctly perceive their interests; some can perceive but 
cannot act. Therefore, the political outcome can go to the quick and nimble, those 
who can organize and capture the imagination. Success or failure is not announced, 
but it is signaled by departures and hires, brief announcements. 
When the political perspective is applied to information technology, IT is 
seen as a resource, and key organizational actors respond to this resource as any 
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other: they seek to control its adoption, management, and use to pursue their 
political interests.39 Building an information system--an online, distributed, 
integrated customer service system-- is generally not an exercise in "rationality". It is 
a statement of war, or, at the very least, a threat to all interests who currently are 
involved in any way with customer service. 40 
What is at stake in important information systems is just about everything: 
how much power will systems confer on various groups, what values and ideologies 
does a particular system strengthen; what future potential for political action does a 
system imply; what changes will occur in working conditions, job definitions, pay, 
skill, respect, social interactions, leadership, public acceptance, legitimacy, and 
budget. 
Systems which do not impact these matters are, by definition, unimportant. 
In this view, information systems require for success not so much a "rational" 
goal, or management, or strategy, or the right technology, but a political coalition 
powerful enough to "get it over." The bigger the project, the greater the power, the 
larger the coalition needed (and the more likely is strong counter-implementation 
and 
Next to the rational strategic planning model, the political model composes 
the largest and fastest growing part of the literature on IT and organizations. Some 
representative findings are: a state governor used the development of a state 
criminal justice information system as the basis for gaining more control over local 
leaders and agencies4', local welfare officials adopted an information system to 
impress federal welfare the development of information systems 
reinforced the power of existing elites (in a study of 40 cities)44, the design of a 
corporate financial reporting system was largely the result of a political process of 
negotiation45, the design of a corporate accounting system was dominated by 
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corporate accounting with the intention of explicitly excluding divisional 
 accountant^^^, and the development of a national computerized criminal history 
system resulted from a series of political compromises over many years. 47 
The Bureaucratic Perspective 
In the bureaucratic perspective organizations are composed of sub-units who 
perform rigidly defined repertoires honed over many years. The learned skills, the 
routines, and programs developed by sub-units have worked satisfactorily over many 
years. These qualities of reliability, routine, precision, are highly valued. The 
culture rewards organizations which can perform reliably.d8 
Organizational sub-units constitute the perceptive apparatus of the 
organization, the entire set of action possibilities, and the entire problem solving 
capability of the organization. Organizations are an "iron cage" characterized by 
structural inertia, cognitive inability to re-think problems, trained incapacity to 
imagine alternatives, and persistent long term tendencies towards stasis, lack of 
change, stability. 
Why do organizations innovate? In the bureaucratic perspective, they 
innovate mostly in order to preserve existing sub-units, routines, sources of funds, 
missions and traditions. In other words, the bureaucratic perspective inverts the 
normal means-end logic. Instead of asking where do we want to go and what means 
do we have to get there, under conditions of bureaucratic rationality organizations 
ask, first, what are the available means and, second, what goals can we therefore 
pursue. 
It is not especially important that an innovation solve some "problem". Many 
of the problems which large organization's address will never be solved, e.g., 
education, crime, productivity, market share, strategic position, national security. 
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The most important criteria for judging an innovation is its contribution to the sub- 
units survival, first, and the organization's survival, second. 
Hence organizations innovate only in incremental ways, and always in ways 
which support existing repertoires and routines. Of course, there is always minor 
technical change going on, e-g., faster computers are installed, software engineering 
is developed, and etc., but these changes are not allowed to impact fundamental 
routines, the organizational "core" activities, the "core" databases, major groups, 
fundamental beliefs, or central missions. Indeed innovations are channeled to 
support traditional conceptions of the organization's mission. 
Organizations may change fast in many h p o r t a n t  ways--areas described 
above as largely "technical", not involving the "core" of the organization 
(management or institutional features). Insofar as organizations do change in 
important ways, a powerful realignment of organizational sub-units, organizational 
routines, programs, standard operating procedures, perceptions and the like is 
involved. One might suspect that this kind of powerful organizational change is 
associated with a crisis, a near miss with disaster, a sharp break with the past, a 
sweeping change in top management, a radical alteration of the environment which 
literally forces change. 
The bureaucratic model suggests that most organizations probably just die-- 
or freeze up-- when faced with these kinds of alternatives. 
Allison's (1971) study of the Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the best known 
study which used a bureaucratic model (along *th a rational and political model) of 
decisionmaking to show how the President was constrained in his responses to the 
Russian/Cuban missile emplacements. The choices facing Kennedy were to unleash 
the Air Force (which could only carry out strategic air strikes for which it had 
trained since W.W.II), the Marines (who could invade the beaches in an amphibious 
assault --something they had practiced since 1940), and the Navy (who could 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89- 11 
blockade--a procedure learned from the British centuries earlier). When the Naval 
blockade was chosen, McNamara: 
" . . . wanted to know which ship would make the first interception, were Russian 
speaking officers aboard, how would submarines be dealt with, would Russian ships 
be given the opportunity to turn back, what would the Navy do if Russian Captains 
refused to answer questions about their cargo?" 
At that point the Chief of Naval Operations picked up the Manual of Naval 
Regulation, waved it at McNarnara and said "it's all in there." McNamara 
responded, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done. I want to 
know what you are going to do tomorrow!" 
The visit ended with the Navy officer inviting the Secretary of Defense to "go 
back to your office and let the Navy run the blockade. 11 49 
Bureaucratic theories have been especially usehl in explaining failure to 
change5', organizational decline, and organizational crisis? Facing crisis, 
organizations--and especially senior management-- are likely to misperceive the 
environment, and very likely to repeat the standard procedures and programs which 
worked so well in the past?2 The misperceptions of senior management in the 
face of very large scale environmental change are legendary, but certainly among 
the most well known is that of Thomas J. Watson, President of IBM in 1948 who 
said "I think there is a world market for about five computersM.53 
How do organizations innovate? Bureaucratic sub-units capture those 
technologies in the environment which strengthen their raison d'etre, historic 
routines and repertoires. Successhl innovations "bubble up" from below. 
Innovations which threaten other powerful sub-units are killed; organizational 
Ieaders who try to impose innovations from the top down are ignored. The leaders 
of powerful sub-units negotiate with one another for change resources. Innovation 
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is a political process, a result of negotiations over long periods among operational 
units. The Strategic Planning Department is simply another sub-unit to negotiate 
with. They must be told by operational sub-units what is possible and from that 
construct a strategic vision of what goals might be pursued. The real function of 
strategic planning in the bureaucratic view is to find new uses for tried and true 
remedies, routines, and beliefs. 
Top down strategic planning, along the lines of the rational model described 
earlier, is dangerous. Such plans threaten the survival of the organization, fail to 
take into account what sub-units can actually deliver, hence they are unrealistic and 
promise what cannot possibly be delivered. 
There is of course a strategic planning unit in most organizations. But 
Strategic planning is an output, a product, of another bureaucratic sub-unit, the 
Strategic Planning Department. Strategic planning is simply another bureaucratic 
program whose invocation is loosely--if at all--related to the problems at hand, 
solutions to problems, or survival. Strategic planning in the bureaucratic 
perspective is an activity which --if it is to be successful-- identifies what the 
operational sub-units are capable of and ways to strengthen their capability. The 
strategic planners must be taught by operational sub-units what is possible and from 
that construct a strategic vision of what goals might be pursued. 
Key actors do not "adapt" to information technology. Rather they capture, 
use, and modify IT to serve bureaucratic sub-unit repertoires, programs, routines, 
and professional agendas. These are the permanent parts of organizational life. In 
this sense, 'problems" do not get solved by infomation technology--any more than 
education is "solved". Programs are begun, money is spent, systems are built, but a 
critical observer will see that not much has changed, the same people are pretty 
much doing the same thing they always did, and the outcomes are pretty much the 
same. 
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The bureaucratic literature on IT innovation is fast growing. It is especially 
useful at explaining decades long change programs engaged in by large 
organizations such as the FBI's twenty year effort to develop a national 
computerized criminal history system despite luke warm support from Congress, 
presidents, and the States 54. Others have used the bureaucratic perspective to 
explain how sub units capture technology to serve their interests 55, why classrooms 
have not been changed much by computer education tools 56, and how the 
Pentagon could spend 30 years trying--but failing-- to get Generals to agree on 
common data elements for WNMCCS (World Wide Military Command and 
Control 
Empirical studies of office and managerial use of computer based 
information systems rarely find '"work transformed." Instead they find, contrary to 
speculation and critics of all sorts, that clerical and managerial work proceeds much 
as before, the computer system is changed in many subtle ways to "fit"" in with office 
life, and few startling gains in productivity result.58 
The case of the FBI's National Computerized Criminal History Project is 
especially instructive. Laudon used a bureaucratic model to explain the 
dogged persistence of the FBI in keeping alive a proposal to develop a national 
computerized criminal history system run by the FBI (as opposed to the States or 
other groups) through fifteen years of luke w m  support in Congress and the states, 
five Presidents, radical shifts in political sentiment, and rapid change in 
Congressional support. Short term political calculations hardly seemed powerful 
enough to explain why or the how the FBI continually, and eventually successfully, 
put forward a national CCH proposal which had little chance of achieving its goal-- 
reducing crime. 
As it turns out, the FBI succeeded in part because Presidents had no choice. 
They could not "act on crime" without working through the only permanent, large, 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89- 11 
federal law enforcement agency, the FBI. Presidents cannot just create new entities. 
The FBI was the only agency around with the personnel and routines to "do 
something about crime." 
While a national CCH may have little to do with the incidence of crime, and 
while there are many other ways information technology could be used to control 
crime, in a bureaucratic policy world this is not important. Policy makers must work 
with what is available, not what might be or could have been. The FBI has spent 60 
years developing manual criminal history systems. This is the core data base of the 
agency--the raison d'etre of its existence. This real instrument can be a "solution" to 
any number of "problems", e.g. identifying victims of disaster, fighting crime, 
terrorism, sexual abuse, credit card fraud, and etc. The function of strategic 
planning at the FBI is to find new uses for this powerful tool and to use whatever 
information technology is available to make criminal files more powerful. 
The Organizational Culture Perspective 
Most trained observers of information systems have at some point in their 
work discovered that some important features of systems they observe are due to 
"organizational culturew-- deeply held assumptions in organiiations which shape the 
building and use of systems. 
The idea of culture is used in many ways by different analysts. For some it 
means regularities of behavior6'; the working no- or expectations which normal 
actors invoke6'; the values of members, especially elites6'; the feeling or climate of 
an organization63. The notion of culture we use here is that of the Anthropologist 
Edgar Schein: culture refers to "the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs 
that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that 
define in a basic "taken for granted" fashion an organization's view of itself and its 
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e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  The bedrock assumptions of an organization are taken for 
granted, learned responses to problems of group survival which work repeatedly, 
and reliably. In Schein's definition, basic assumptions are like bureaucratic 
routines: they are learned responses, rarely questioned, unconscious. This means 
culture must be inferred by the analyst: locals do not consciously discover their 
culture and talk about it. The locals enact their culture. Technology, organization, 
norms, and values are simply artifacts of the more fundamental cultural assumptions 
in an organization. 
What are some examples of deep seated cultural assumptions? Here are 
some: the organization's basic relationship to the environment including what is the 
product or service, who is the customer or client; the nature of reality, time, and 
space; the nature of human nature; the nature of human activity and relationships; 
66 the nature of the environment . 
Why do organizations innovate? In the cultural perspective planned 
organizational innovation is designed to strengthen and sustain the fundamental 
cultural assumptions of the organization. This means organizations do not 
intentionally innovate in ways which threaten their bedrock assumptions, and it 
means organizations are continually adopting new technologies to strengthen their 
predominant cultures. 
Sometimes the cultural assumptions of an organization just fail to work. At 
these times of crisis, many organizations simply expire, others limp along, and still 
others miraculously arise from the ashes into new forms. 
There are many unintentional ways in which organizations innovate as well. 
Culture connict (exposure to multiple cultures) can provide the source of new 
assumptions, as can deviant subgroups, and random variation in behavior. 
How do organizations innovate? Planned, intentional innovation is led by 
senior and respected members of the culture. In part, the control which elders 
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exercise over planned change guarantees a conservative result. The function of 
leaders is to permit just enough change in the organization's arrangements to adjust 
to the environment without at the same time destroying the organization's 
assumptions. Leaders also change the innovations--the technologies in particular-- 
so that they conform to the organizations assumptions. This means much 
organizational innovation is ritualistic--the forms are adopted but not the substance. 
Unplanned innovation is carried out at lower levels by deviant groups and 
individuals. This activity is continuous, youthful, rebellious, and efforts are made to 
carefully control the outcomes. 
Information technology is a superb area of innovation to observe the power 
which organizational culture exercises over innovation. One recent study found for 
instance that a formal system development methodology which was supposed to 
allocate responsibility in a project and assure that the system developed in 
accordance with user specifications, in fact provided "opportunities for covering 
one's position, blaming others, and escaping responsibility for poor performance." 
The authors concluded that "rituals in system development function to maintain the 
appearance of rationality in systems development and in organizational decision 
making. Regardless of whether it actually produces rational outcomes or not, 
systems development must symbolize rationality and s i w  that the actions taken 
are not arbitrary, but rather acceptable within the organizations ideology." 
Other cultural studies of information technology have explored the social 
movement character of the t echn~ logy~~ ,  the manner in which organizational 
culture permeates the systems analysis and design process70, the design of 
accounting systems71 and office automation systems 72 
The Random (Garbage Can) Perspective 
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The garbage can perspective on organizational change results from a 
common obse~ation: things rarely work out as planned in organizational life (even 
when things out alright). The garbage can perspective on innovation argues that 
problems, participants, solutions, and choice opportunities follow independent 
streams. "Things happen" but not necessarily by choice; "solutions" are attempted 
but problems are not "solved; "Plans" exist, are implemented, but the objectives 
achieved are different than planned. There are clear cut strategies and tactics 
outlined on paper, but the path to any objective generally does not follow the 
strategy. The entire organizational process seems heavily influenced by individual 
entrepreneurs and personalities, unexpected coalitions of sub-groups, failed 
structural solutions, and rapid environmental changes that defy prediction. 
Random process models of change focus on the ambiguity of life in 
organizations. Technology, preferences, participants,the past actions of the 
organizations (and their rationales) are all unclear. Organizations in this view are 
organized anarchies. 
Why do organizations innovate in this atmosphere? In this perspective 
organizations are garbage cans in which solutions, problems, decision makers, and 
choice opportunities are dumped. Each has an independent source. Time--the 
happenstance arrival of participants, problems, solutions, choice opportunities-- 
connects these elements together permitting organizations to arrive at a "solution", 
an "innovation". 
How does innovation take place? Decision makers at any one point in time 
become active, identify problems, which may be issues of concern to them 
personally or to outsiders. Activation of decision makers is often random, but is 
sometimes linked to outsiders who demand decisions. Solutions are products of 
decision makers. At any point in time, the organization is filled with solutions 
looking for problems. Cohen et. al, the originators of this perspective argue: 
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"A computer is not just a solution to a problem in payroll management, discovered 
when needed. It is an answer actively looking for a question. . . Despite the dictum 
that you cannot find the answer until you have formulated the question well, you 
often do not know what the question is in organizational problem solving until you 
know the answer." Because of demands on members time, decision makers come 
and go in random sequences. 
Driving the process along are choice opportunities. These are times when 
organizations are expected to produce behavior called a "decision": spend money, 
start a plan, hire or fire people, sign contracts, initiate procurements, and etc. There 
are internal and external time clocks which force choice opportunities, e-g., the 
annual budget cycle, the annual appropriations hearings. Opportunities are 
frequent, and the organization can always declare them in the absence of any 
stimulus from outside. 
Culminating tlurty years of research critical of "rational" models of choice 
and change, the random process perspective have been used in computer 
 simulation^^^, and empirical case studies from selection of a dean, location of a 
university to strategic planning at the Pentagon, procurement of 
advanced battlefield systems, and military operations. 
When the garbage can perspective is applied to long term change projects-- 
like SSA's Sh4P--some interesting results emerge. One study examined policy 
innovation over a thirty five year period at the Canadian National Film Board and 
found that organizational strategies occurred, happened, without always being 
intended or planned by the "organization." Looking at the content of 2,839 films, 
the authors found the National Film Board moving into and out of focus over the 
years, with content changing in "blips" (a brief out burst) , "trickles" (a steady stream 
of films with similar content), and "focused strategies" (a large stream of films with 
shared contents). Planned strategies often never were realized, realized strategies 
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seemed to emerge from trial and error, chance success, opportunity. The search for 
a strategy was always on-going, pushed by a need for a "sense of definition," the 
environment (war pictures in the 40's, then television in the 50's, then social 
message films in the 60's), and the convenience of harmonious gestalts, 
configurations, between periods of revolution. In the end, the authors concluded 
that the National Film Board was adaptive although in retrospect it is difficult to 
say this adaptation occurred by plan, by intention. It just happened. The authors 
concluded that a "grass roots" model of strategy is more descriptive of how 
organizations actually behave than a "top down" model. 
A study of the ten year development cycle for major information systems at 
the Pentagon found that the resulting decisions, and the resulting weapons systems, 
are often unwanted or unexpected by most major participants. The author describes 
how major command, control and communications (so-called C3 systems) are 
developed: 
"One need not go more deeply into the C3 acquisition process to understand 
that the outcomes emerging from these basically ad hoc combinations of processes, 
procedures, and decisions are not planned in any precise sense. 
In general, C3 systems that come to fruition and are finally deployed may or 
may not support military operations or enhance military capability. 
Consider how many different Army organizations formally must "sign off' on 
the hypothetical system . . in order to get through the Service System Evaluation 
Stage. Consider the external support necessary in moving from successful system 
evaluation to planning and programming, and finally the support necessary for 
budgeting and deployment. 
It should be clear however, that without explicit attempts to organize the 
anarchy, it is extremely unlikely that outcomes will support military operations and 
concepts in ways intended when a project is initially conceived. 
After a more than decade long process, involving a cast of characters that is 
programmed to change (e.g. military personnel with limited tours of duty), 
compromises in design and concept, as new process and participants are 
encountered, each with their own concerns and constraints, and changing 
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technologies and military threats, it is wonder that any system emerging would 77 reflect any coherent conception at all . 
The apparent anarchy observed at the Pentagon can temporarily be 
overcome by the fortuitous anival of individual entrepreneurs who can shepherd a 
program through years of resistance, powerful patrons (Admiral Raborn or Robert 
McNam ) who can put together coalitions and coordinate parallel streams in the ?ti anarchy. 
There have been few systematic efforts to use a garbage can model in the IT 
innovation area. Anecdotes in several works stand out. Laudon's description of 
how a national computerized crirninal history system got attached to the problem of 
"crime" in American society (Laudon, 1986); Kling and Iacono's description of 
computerization as a "social movement" where computers get attached in the public 
consciousness to problems in an unpredictable and usually exaggerate manner 
(Kling and Iacono, 1986); KLing's description of the sustained failure of WWMCCS 
(World Wide Military Command and Control System) and the negotiated social 
reality of computing systems which span organizational boundaries (IUing, 1986). 
In general, the garbage can perspective is not sanguine about the prospects 
for long term, closely guided, "strategic" change in an organizations core information 
technology?9 
The Deputy Commissioner Considers 
Now lets return to our hypothetical Deputy Commissioner of Systems at SSA 
and get his response to our review so far. 
First, the Commissioner would probably recognize the political and 
bureaucratic perspectives quite easily. He knows that a very large change program 
like SMP will need the support of powerful political actors in Congress and at the 
White House, not to mention internal political groups as well. And he also knows 
that without the support and understanding of existing operations personnel in 
systems, and operations personnel in the field who actually deliver SSA services, 
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there is little prospect for a successful SMP program. He knows he must capture 
whatever enthusiasm for change exists in the organization, and avoid open dissent 
when possible. 
The cultural assumptions of system will, after a little thought, also be readily 
apparent to the Commissioner. SSA was built .on the assumption of face-to-face 
client service, a professional case worker, documents and procedures that 
uneducated people could understand, a district office close to clients, comfortable 
surroundings, and helpful, dedicated personnel who really understood the rules. 
Any system which violated these bedrock assumptions of SSA would be in deep 
trouble from the outset. Every effort in the past to change these assumptions has 
largely come to naught. 
The garbage can perspective would be a little strange at first to the 
Commissioner. But with a little thought the Commissioner might find some 
correspondence with SSA reality. SMP is a ten year re-build effort. In that time 
frame SSA managers and top personnel come and go; Presidents and Congressmen 
come and go; there are unplanned failures and successes; the computer industry can 
change as can conceptions on how to use system, how to deliver service; political 
agendas change. The window of opportunity in Washington for bringing about 
significant change at SSA--or other huge agencies-may be much smaller and shorter 
in length than imagined. 
The Commissioner knows very well that he does not control all the pieces of 
the pie. Whatever does happen with SMP will in part be unpredictable. At best the 
Commissioner can hope to start a change process, and move the organization in the 
right direction, but he cannot hope to dictate the process or its results. 
Section 5: Environmental Models and Perspectives on Organizational Innovation 
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While the institutional perspectives reviewed above tend to emphasize 
volition, choice, planning, and focus on the adaptation of individual orgrmizatiom to 
the environment, environmental perspectives focus on changes inpopulatiom of 
organizations as environmental features change. Hence proponents of this view refer 
to themselves as ecologists. 
Development of the Ecological/Environmental Perspective 
The ecological perspective in organizational sociology has developed only in 
the last 15 years. Contemporary sociological use of the biological metaphor 
"ecology" to describe social affairs originated in the Chicago School of urban 
anthropology in the 1930's a concept designed to related individual behavior to 
territory and city environments in the 1930s. Use of the concept grew in the 
early 1950's under the influence of the treatise on human ecology written by 
~ a w l e ~ . ~  But the focus was not on organizations so much as communities. 
Interest in environmental and ecological approaches waned in the 1960's under the 
influence of Parsonian functionalism, then Marxist, neo-marxist, and new left 
perspectives. 
In 1953 the index to the American Journal of Sociology contained only 6 
references to bureaucracy, and no references to organization, complex organization, 
let alone organizational environments. By the 1960's, organizational sociology 
emerged as a powerful, growing field. Within organizational studies, a major 
theoretical growth area since the early 1970's has been the so-called "open system 
natural views" with an emphasis on environmental determinants of organizational 
behavior? These early works differed from the Weberian tradition of bureaucratic 
studies which focused almost exclusively on internal, institutional features of 
organizations, e.g., hierarchy, rules, structure, shared cultural (institutional) 
assumptions, and a supportive, benign environment. 
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"Environmental perspectives" are now a standard organizational sociology 
topic included in most texts and handbooks to the field.83 
As we see below, the ecological perspective during the 1980s began to 
influence management schools and writers on organizational innovation. 
Eventually, these views will have in an impact on theorizing about information 
technology innovation. 
Diferent Views of the Environment 
For some in the ecological school, the environment is hostile, threatening, 
and troublesome. This group of scholars ("population ecologists") focus on 
environmental selection--the death of organizations and what causes death. Others 
(so called "community ecologists") focus on variation--the continual birth of new 
ideas, behaviors, and organizations which occur in communities. 84 
A distant but related group of authors focus on the dependency of 
organizations on the environment for resources and support-- a perspective called 
'resource dependency'. For this group, organizations behave in certain ways 
because outside powerful groups offer (or deny) resources like money, legitimacy, 
and people. Organizations are a part of networks which control resources, which 
regulate organizations, and provide support.85 Resource dependency theorists 
focus less on populations of organizations, and more on the operation of inter- 
organizational networks which channel resources. 
The commonality among all three views centers about resources: 
environments affect organizations by providing or withholding resources.86 The 
major themes of all environmental perspectives are organizational death, the birth 
of new organizations, organizational dependency on outsiders for support, 
population variation and selection, population death rates, and analyzing the 
dimensions of the environments. 87 
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How Organizational Change Happens 
According to ecologists, while organizational change is ubiquitous, individual 
organizations themselves do not change much, if at all, because of internal politics, 
and bureaucracy. Most organizations die as a result of environmental change. 
Depending on the richness and munificence of the environment, old dead 
organizations are replaced by new infant organizations who happen to have the 
correct resource mixture to survive in the new environment. 
In this perspective organizational change occurs at the population level and 
what needs explaining is not so much why individual organizations fail to adapt 
(although that is interesting) but rather why and how environments change and 
cause birth rates and death rates to vary. 
Evolution is blind--there is no movement towards a particular form of 
organization, no stages of development. Innovation (variation) is random with 
respect to adaptive value. That is, there are always many new organizations with 
new ideas seeking support. Environments optimize, not organizations. Insofar as 
organizations survive, it is because they have achieved a niche in a stable 
environment. Innovations spread through a population and are retained because 
they work, because organizations using the innovation prosper, because the 
organization fits its environment, because organizations which do not have the right 
resource mixture are selected out for extinction and free up resources for survivors. 
When the environment changes in even minor ways, old organizations can no 
longer compete for resources with new organizations, and new organizations spring 
up all around them who can optimize in the new environment. Old organizations 
are replaced, not "changed". 
The key concepts then are variation (the continual development of new 
behavior, innovations, and new organizations); environmental selection through 
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competition for resources, and retention. The key problem is to find out are what 
are the technical, economic, political, and cultural changes in the environment 
which shape the birth, prosperity, and death for populations of organizations. 
Why L)o Organizatzons Innovate? 
Both types of ecologists argue that individual organizatzons do not innovate--at 
least not in important "core" changing ways. Minor variations, innovations, of course 
occur all the time--electric pencil sharpeners replace manual models, word 
processors replace typists. Real innovation goes on at the population 
level because new organizations arise all the time based on new technologies, new 
ideas, and new skills. By dying, old organizations free up resources which can be 
invested in new organizations. 
"Resource dependency" theorists have not focused directly on innovation, 
and tend to focus on maintenance of existing organizations, and existing resource 
networks, strategies, and so forth. Resource dependency theorists would probably 
argue (if they were consistent) that organizations innovate when they receive 
resources and support from the environment and this is problematic. 
How Do Organizations Innovate? 
At the population level, organizational innovation is accomplished by new 
entrepreneurial units forming around new technologies, new ideas, and new skills. 
Innovation occurs in small, recently born units at first. These small organizations 
have a very high probability of dying in the first year (70% of small businesses die in 
the first year). However, when a new technology takes hold, and spreads throughout 
the population, change is abrupt, rapid, and brutal to the old organizations. 
Major Sources of Environmental Vmation 
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Some environments seem particularly hostile, others more benign. Life in a 
benign environment may confer long life on organizations occupying that 
environment, especially if they can prevent the entrance of new organizations. 
What are the major environmental factors which govern survival and 
innovation? Why are some environments benign, others hostile? Why are some 
environments hard to survive in? 
There are a large number of environmental factors described in previous 
research.88 Aldrich's 1979 review of the field listed six central features which 
summarized much of the previous work.89 A recent empirical study of 52 
manufacturing industries (not firms) by Dess and Beard codified these six 
dimensions into a more parsimonious set of three measurable dimensions: 
environmental munificence, turbulence, and c&nplexity 90 
Dess and Beard found these three dimensions successfully accounted for 
inter-industry variation in over 20 industry features on which data had been 
collected by the Bureau of the Census such as growth, sales concentration, diversity 
of products, instability (sales, price-cost margin,employment, technology, and value 
added), and geographical concentration. Below we describe these environmental 
dimensions. 
Munificence 
"Munificence" essentially refers to growth in market demand or, in the public 
sector, new public policies which direct specific agencies to expand, new programs, 
new missions, and a great deal of new money. 'Munificence can also mean 
ideological, symbolic support although Dess and Beard eschewed such measures 
because they felt they were not measurable. This dimension is sometimes called in 
the sociological literature "environmental carrying capacity." 
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In government agencies Like those we are examining, munificence can be 
operationalized as budget growth and clientele growth. 
Turbulence 
'Turbulence" refers to rates of change in key strategic areas such as market 
sales, prices, and production technologies. Other phrases which connote the same 
meaning are stabilitylinstability, uncertainty, environmental dynamism, 
unpredictability. This dimension does not refer to "rate of change", but rather 
unpredictable changes. 
In Dess and Beard's study they found, interestingly, that under certain factor 
analysis techniques the dynamism (turbulence) factor broke into two independent 
dimensions: 7echnological turbulence" (technology change in capital goods 
industries) and "market turbulence" (changes in sales among all industries). 
In government circles, "turbulence" can be rapid change in regulations, 
benefit formulas, programs, as well as abinis@ative technology. What is involved 
in turbulence is not high rates of change, but unpredictable change. 
In government agencies, "turbulence" can be measured as inter-year 
variations in budgets and clientele, and the addition of new programs. 
Complexity 
Highly overused and underspecified, "complexity" usually refers to the 
heterogeneity of inputs and outputs, but it has also been operationalized as a high 
degree of geographic dispersion (vs. concentration) of industriesg1 In popular 
literature, "complexity" is often confused with turbulence, or rates of change, but this 
view is not standard. When some authors use the word "complexity" they are 
referring to high rates of change even though in the technical literature this 
phenomenon is best described as "turbulence." 
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The more generally accepted view is that complexity refers to a straight count 
of the number of units involved in organizational life. Industries are complex when 
firms produce products having a large number of inputs, and they are forced to deal 
with a large number of suppliers. Likewise, the more products a firm produces, the 
large the number of customers, distributors, and other market players the £irm must 
deal with. This is sometimes referred to as "organizational density", or the number 
of players in an organizational "set". 
In this view, organizations which serve a geographically dispersed clientele 
face a more "complex" environment because the organization is forced to operate in 
several micro-environments each of which is quite different. Greater environmental 
complexity is seen as increasing the information processing demands, 
decisionmaking, and knowledge demands on organizations. 
For information systems, the number of clients in a system, the diversity of 
clients, the number of different users, and the frequency of transactions, have been 
used to measure a system's "complexity."92 
In government insurance agencies like SSA, complexity can be 
operationalized as the diversity of programs and services which agencies provide, 
the geographic and social diversity of clients, the number of formulas (statutory 
codes and regulations) used to calculate entitlements, or taxes. 
Other Dimensions of the Environment 
A number of other dimensions of the environment have been noted but 
ignored by many authors simply because these dimensions are not easily measured. 
One such dimension is the degree consensus or dissensus in an environment among 
participants. For instance, in some environments, other occupants may either be 
supportive or intolerant of others. 
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Another dimension of environments is the legitimacy accorded a particular 
environment or environmental niche by the larger culture. For instance, during 
much the past 20 years there has been a decline in the confidence people express in 
all levels of government. This decline in confidence may well reduce expenditures 
for government s e ~ c e s .  
Management Perceptions of the Environment 
A somewhat different consideration concerns management perceptions of 
environments. Much of the management literature assumes that managers, 
especially top managers, accurately perceive their environments. As we noted 
above, this is simply false. Managers routinely.misperceive their  environment^.^ 
In crises, managers are just as likely to make things worse as better.94 
A substantial body of behavioral research on risk taking has established that 
managers routinely ignore the possibility of high consequence, negative outcomes, 
misperceive chance events as causally sigdicant, alter their estimates of risk to 
accommodate anticipated gains (or losses), eschew risk taking in practice while 
extolling it in writing, alter risk assessment to reflect attention factors, and believe 
they can manage affairs which are inherently unmanageable.95 Briefly, the neo- 
classical view of decisionmaking under conditions of risk where expected values of 
outcomes are modified by perceived risks of outcomes does not seem to describe 
how managers actually perceive risk, or behave when facing risky decisions. 
A recent study of organizational downward spirals culminating in death 
documents the role of management inertia, vacillation, stress induced perceptual 
errors, and resulting strategic extremism, in the ten year long declines of bankrupt 
firms. Despite munificent environments and plenty of financial reserves, managers 
were still able to sink otherwise healthy firms over long periods.9 
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The Environmental Argument 
In general, the less the mu&?cence, the more the turbulence, and the greater 
the complexity, then the less the chance for organizational survival and/or "success" 
however measured. 
Is organizational death as commonplace as ecologists would have us believe? 
Most organizations do not survive a human life time. One study found for instance 
that only (53.6%) of the Fortune 500 survived from 1955-1985 97 Another study 
found that of the top 100 industrial firms in 1917, only 17 survived in 1986 98 
Over a longer time frame suntiival is very problematic: only 13 of the 
thousands of businesses in existence at the time of the Revolution still exist in 1976 
99 50 year old corporations represent only 2% of those initially created; 55 year 
old federal agencies represent only 4% of those ever created; 30% of the fifty year 
old private corporations can be expected to disappear in 10 years, as can 26% of 
fifty year old federal agencies-lo0 Of 389 new social service agencies born in 
Toronto from 1970-1980, only 28% survived ten years. 101 
In general, there is a large body of evidence which indicates organizational 
survival for more than ten years is highly problematic despite the good cheer in 
schools of management which promise salvation from these facts lo2 
Relationship to Management Ideology and Management Teaching 
The ecological or environment school of organizational sociology and 
research is directly at odds with much of the philosophy of management, the 
ideology of management, and what is taught in management schools. Oddly, 
interviews with real world business managers, entrepreneurs, and financiers, often 
reveal some support for the ecological perspective--especially the role of luck, 
chance, and "being in the right place at the right time". 
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A central tenet of the philosophy of management as taught in American 
business schools is that managers can act in such a way as to ensure or enhance 
organizational survival. If only the "right" choices are made, then success and 
survival are reasonable prospects. Many cases of success are available. 
Ecologists might agree that managers are important but only within a benign, 
unchanging environment of low complexity, low turbulence, and high munificence. 
As there are few such environments worth being in, organizations are frequently in 
trouble. In challenging environments of some complexity, turbulence, and changing 
munificence, ecologists would argue that environments dominate, luck and chance 
determine surviving strategies, and that most of the time managers do not respond 
properly and the firm dies. 
Clearly the ecological perspective is beginning to have an impact on 
management school scholars. One business school group of scholars, in. an effort to 
address the ecologists and preserve some positive role for managers, argues in an 
award winning paper that superior management can overcome hostile 
environmental change (Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli, 1986).lo3 Four [sic] 
cases are given as evidence: Citibank, General.Radio, Prime Computer, and Alpha 
Corporation. 
Out of the hundreds of thousands of business organizations in existence 
during the period of the study, shear chance alone would suggest that in some cases 
some organizations get lucky and ride out the stom. People do win in Las Vegas. 
Nevertheless, the authors ignore chance altogether and proceed to examine the 
cases for patterns of survival, for the key management actions that allowed these 
organizations to survive. 
These authors concede that the only way survival can be assured is to 
occasionally initiate a "frame-breaking" change in the organizational culture, setting 
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off an "organizational upheaval" led by top level executives who see the handwriting 
on the wall. 
This response, however confident it makes management students feel, seems 
to miss the point. Top level senior executives are themselves the problem in the 
ecological perspective because they rarely see the handwriting on the wall until it is 
too late. Frame-breaking changes are themselves virtually impossible to pull off 
with any regularity. Indeed, frame-breaking change is somewhat of a contradiction 
in organizations, commonly described elsewhere as "an iron cage." 
Environmental Models and IT Innovation 
How do environmental factors affect information technology innovation? 
In general, the IT innovation literature has assumed that organizations more 
or less independently adapt to changing environmental conditions, including new 
technology. There may be political, bureaucratic, cultural, and random difficulties, 
but these--it is assumed-- can generally be over come. Politicians may use the 
technology for their own purposes, bureaucratic sub-units will pursue their 
traditional goals (preservation of routines), and the technology used may not be 
optimal, may not "solve" any problems, and so forth. But the end resuIt is still an 
adaptive organization lo4 But consider the role of environmental factors in the 
following IT innovations. From 1972 to 1982 forty States developed computerized 
criminal history systems as the Department of justice distributed one billion dollars 
to pay for the systems lo5 All fifty states now have a Parent Locator System after 
Congress mandated loss of AFDC funds if states refused.lo6 All states plan to have 
in place by 1990 a State Income Eligiblity Verification System (SIEVS) to check all 
beneficiaries who receive federal funds--or face the loss of federal benefit 
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dollars! lo7 In 1985 a coalition of New York retail banks built a network of 1000 
A m  machines after Citibank demonstrated the power of its 600 ATM network lo8 
These examples illustrate that powerful' environmental forces shape IT 
innovation. None of these innovations occurred primarily because of internal, 
institutional factors, independent adoption and innovation. Instead the primary 
stimulus for developing the information systems in the above paragraph originated 
outside the organization, in the environment. 
Why should changes in information technology be difficult for organizations 
to cope with? One study found a possible answer. Information technology--like 
most technology--changes incrementally over long periods, but it is characterized by 
periodic quantum leaps--the change from vacuum tube to transistor, to integrated 
circuits on a chip. 
When information technology change is slow, organizations enhance their 
competence, slowly expanding their skill base. -This is "competence enhancing" 
change. However, technology change is very fast, it destroys the competence 
and skills of organizations who mastered the old technology and who find 
themselves unable to master the new 109 
In these examples a powerful environmental stimulus shapes the concept, 
design, and even management of information systems which organizations use. The 
stimulus can be the actions of competitors, the threats and resources of superior 
governmental units, and new technologies. The local internal politics, culture, 
bureaucracy are largely incidental to the nature of systems developed in these 
110 cases . 
The Deputy Commissioner Responds 
Let's return for one last interview with our Deputy Commissioner of Systems 
at SSA for his reaction to environmental theories. 
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"You must be nuts! I was hired to develop one of the most important 
domestic computer systems in the United States which delivers checks to 50 million 
people each month, on time, and virtually all accurate. I was not hired to preside 
over a funeral, saying nothing can be done. Can you imagine if I testified before a 
Congressional hearing and said, "Ghee fellas, the environment is so bad that I really 
can't do much about the decay of Social Security's information systems? The agency 
is just caught up in an "iron cage" right now, most of my managers don't know what 
to do, and what they think they want to do is mostly wrong." I'd be £ired on the 
spot." 
The Commissioner would reject outright the notion that SSA cannot 
innovate its way out of trouble. Both the population and community ecology 
perspectives must certainly be wrong he believes when they imply that other new 
organizations might come along to replace SSA The resource dependency 
perspective makes perfect sense to the Commissioner--clearly SSA is vitally 
dependent on the President's recommendation, the dollars from Congress, and 
support of the Judiciary. Other outside private groups are vital to SSA as well. 
But what organization could possibly replace SSA and handle the case load? 
Who is politically powerful enough to carry off an attack on SSA? The agency has a 
long history of incremental change in systems, enhancements, and what's needed 
now is just more and faster innovations. 
Both ecology perspectives run against everything the Commissioner has 
learned in management schools and training seminars. There simply must be a way 
to manage SSA out of the troubles it has fallen into. Everyone expects the Deputy 
Commissioner to do something. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-89- 11 
Still, the Commissioner would concede that overcoming the political, 
bureaucratic, and cultural inertia at SSA will be a monumental problem--perhaps it 
is the single most important problem over which SSA has some control. 
Admittedly, the Commissioner concedes, the rapidly changing technology, 
coupled with hostile external groups, will be pushing SSA very hard, some 
conservatives even calling for SSA's replacement by private concerns. But 
considering life without SSA, and the puny resources available to competitors (who 
has 12 million lines of COBOL code capable of running a national insurance 
program?), the Commissioner believes SSA's future will be secure if it can show a 
good faith effort towards internal change, re-birth. Failing that, the ecologists might 
just be right and SSA would deserve to die. 
Still, SSA is so much a part of the social, cultural and political landscape, that 
even contemplating its death is enough to scare any Congressman into voting more 
funds for SSA. One of SSA's best strategies, in a jam, is to make life uncomfortable 
for some beneficiaries. In a few hours, Congressional telephones are ringing off the 
hook, the editorial writers are wagging fingers, and reporters are out interviewing 
irate citizens. Even Congressional conservative are begging SSA for relief. 
The ecological model may be substantially correct, but it is politically, 
culturally, and socially unacceptable in management circles and wherever power is 
concentrated and exercised. 
Section 6 The General Model Specified 
With the foregoing review of the literature, we can now provide a more 
detailed description of the preliminary model introduced earlier. The illustration 
below presents the general mode1 with the major blocks of explanatory variables 
specified. 
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The general idea of the model is eclectic: organizational behavior is a 
function of both environmental and institutional factors or variables. The major 
environmental variables are munificence, turbulence, and complexity. A variety of 
institutional factors are pointed to: rational expectations and calculations, politics, 
bureaucracy, culture, and random processes and events. 
Environmental and institutional variables interact and influence one another. 
Organizations can pick and choose environments, but there are limits to this. SSA 
cannot become a private industry, or switch roles with the FBI. 
Organizational behavior, the central block in the middle of the diagram, is 
composed itself of three components. The formal organizational mission and 
strategies are primary, focal concerns in our work. These are shaped entirely by 
environmental and institutional factors. 
Other organizational behavior of concern is information system strategies 
(the formal and informal plans for building systems) and system implementation 
(adoption, implementation, and routinization). 
The last concern of the model is "impacts." As can be seen, "impacts" of 
systems do not "hit" organizations like meteorites. Computers per se do not "flatten 
hierarchies", re-arrange organizations, enhance or destroy skills, and etc. 
Instead, computer "impacts" result from the interplay of a large number of 
factors. At the widest level of analysis, computer "impacts" result from broad 
environmental and institutional factors. At a more specific level, "impacts" result 
from how organizations respond to these environmental and institutional factors-- 
from concrete decisions made by people throughout the organization at many levels. 
Using the Model 
Currently we are using the model as a tool to help organize our observations, 
and guide our questions. We are not using the model to generate and test specific 
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hypotheses of the sort, "the greater the complexity of the environment, the more (or 
less) successful is system implementation." Instead, we are more interested in 
describing how, over long periods of time, environments and institutional factors 
shaped the building of systems at three federal agencies since the 1930's. 
Time and history have turned out to be important elements of our story. In 
the illustration below, the potential for temporal comparisons is shown. Over long 
periods of times (1935-1990), one can ask how does the single Washington 
environment for the agencies change and with what impact on system building? Or, 
at any point in time, one can ask how the different micro policy environments of the 
different agencies impact system building, and produce "impacts" for citizens. 
Conclusion 
There are several tests for a model: utility, simplicity, generality, and 
provocativeness were ow major goals. We have found the model useful to date in 
collecting and organizing our observations and data. It is relatively simple and 
easily explained to decisionmakers, managers, and other academics. The model is 
clear and transparent with an obvious flow of causality that can be defended and 
attacked. The model fits into major streams of research in the behavioral 
sciences with a bias towards sociology and political science. And the model shares 
some of the major assumptions of other authors in the field loosely called "the social 
impact of computing" as well as management information systems. It therefore 
fulfills a criterion of generality. In particular the model is very close to other groups 
of scholars consciously theorizing about information technology over long periods of 
time like that Kraemer and King in a forthcoming volume. 111 
Limitations are apparent. Some of the variables cannot be measured easily, 
at least with our current three cases. For instance, the influence of purely random 
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garbage can events can be documented, but they are difficult to measure in terms of 
their impact. It is difficult to objectively measure "bureaucracy" even though, the 
three federal agencies we examine (SSA, FBI, IRS) are bureaucracies incarnate. It 
is less difficult to describe instances of bureaucratic tactics, and thinking. 
It is also conceptually difficult at times to operationalize the environmental 
variables. For instance, assume a new technology comes along which drops the cost 
of computing by a factor of ten. In terms of extant large organizations, this appears 
to be a munificent event. Technology is, after all, one resource provided by the 
culture along with money, programs, and budgets. 
On the other hand, a technological breakthrough adds to "turbulence": an 
unexpected breakthrough suddenly makes much of what you do cost ineffective. 
The computers and systems you just built last year are now a little obsolete. In order 
to take advantage of some new technologies, your organizations may have to 
completely re-think how it works, write new business procedures, and so forth. We 
know from prior literature, that one consequent of technological change is to kill off 
old organizations that cannot make use of the new technology in a timely fashion. 
Because of these difficulties the model has provoked new thoughts on 
appropriate measures, concepts, and relationships. One new relationship provoked 
by the model, and careful observation, is that an organization's information system 
strategies at T I  can shape the organizational mission and objectives at T2 simply 
because what an organization wants to do is bound up with what its aged, very large 
scale systems will permit it to do. Clearly the causal relationships implied by the 
model need more exploration in a number of different settings. 
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become commodities, and competition focuses on price not innovation) . 
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In this view old, stable populations continue to exist, drag on, for long periods of 
time, and really do not change much at all. But new populations spring up-not 
gradually--but abruptly, episodically. Old populations likewise are suddenly 
extinguished (after reasonable eriods of co-existence). Evolution is not slow and 
1985). 
t gradual (so-called phyletic) but wnpy like a "punctuated equilibrium" (Astley, 
What causes evolution and organizational change and innovation to be 
bumpy and step-like? Sahal (1981) studied atterns of technological innovation in 
different industries. He found industries to ! e "technologically insular" f'rom one 
another and unlikely to change "core" technologies despite the presence of new 
technologies and forms of organization all around them. 
Sahal examined the tractor, airplane, and electric motor industries, all of 
which rely on core technologies more than 50 years old. While each industry has 
made cost improvements in the technology, there have been no wholesale changes 
in core technology. However, when a change occurs in core technology, it triggers 
abrupt, rapid change in which many old organizations disappear. 
As Astley (1985) notes, there are declining marginal returns on investment in 
any technology (see also Kuznets, 1930). If technology is constant, populations of 
organizations eventually exhaust the possibilities, and change ceases. 
Chandler (1977) found the spread of the modem American multi-unit 
business form to be abrupt, occurring between 1870 and 1920, and related to the rise 
of new industxies based on new technologies. - 
Mensch (1979), studying the impact of technological change on long term 
industry trends, found that ''basic innovations" lead to whole new branches of an 
evolutionary tree with new markets, customers, and competitors. But "improvement 
innovations" simply involve linear extensions of existing branches. The pattern of 
long term innovation which Mensch found was characterized by spurts of innovation 
followed by improvement innovations followed by a "running out of steam" which he 
characterized as "technological stalemate." Industry populations at this point must 
switch to new basic innovation to vow and e 
'ipand- The direction of evolution 1s different or population and community ecology 
theories. In population ecology, populations become homogeneous over time as 
successful fonns imitate one another or organizations are selected out for extinction. 
In community models, evolution is blind but open-ended: new branches, niches, and 
environments are opening up all the time. New technologies are appearing all the 
time; there is a plentiful supply of new organizations (organizational variation) to 
exploit new technology. Historical happenstance, chance, link up new techniques 
with new organizations to make for "organizational divides". 
The driving force behind evolution in these models is not selection, but 
organizational variation. As Astley notes, "selection is the regulator of evolutionary 
change; variation is its dynamo" (Astley, 1985:240). 
What about the mecharucs of change? Organizations choose to move into open 
environmental spaces. They are not optimally fit,but "tolerably fit" to explo~t new 
opportunities--new technologies, resources. The community grows new po ulations P in this open environment until community closirre sets in and competition or 
resources begins. Populations become more similar under resource constraints; 
between populations, symbiosis (interdependencies) emerge. Selection eliminates 
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weak organizations. The community stabilizes and sets the stage for its own demise. 
The return on investments in the established ways of doing thin s declines. 
Depressions occur. New technologies come along in spurts, an d bunches-related to 
underlying basic innovations--and capital seeks new investments which promise 
much greater returns (Mensch, 1979). Change is abrupt once it occurs: old 
communities are abandoned (Astley, 1985). 
What fosters organizational variation? Basic technology change is one 
factor. Astley compares it to gene mutations. But in order for mutant genes to take 
hold, they need to be isolated from the dominant gene pool. Isolation IS the second 
factor which along with technology makes for organizational variation. New 
technologies cannot thrive in old populations, or communities. 
The semi-conductor industry is used as an example: new technologies 
(transistors, integrated circuits, large scale integrated mcuits) were dependent on 
new isolated organizational units (businesses like Texas Instruments, Fairchild, and 
Intel) to sunive and prosper. Despite enormous investments by RCA, GE, and 
Westinghouse, these larger older firms could not keep up with the likes of the newer 
firms. The old firms tended to smother new innovations even though they invested 
millions in their development. The Silicon Valley phenomenon of one "spin off 
£irm'' after another making up a community exemplifies the process of community 
ecology change. At times community ecology slips away from environmental 
determinism lnto opportunistic choice as the engine of change--really into an 
institutional perspective where the organization can exercise choice over its future. 
Environments in this view can be seen as "open environmental spaces" 
(Astley, 1985:233) which contain opportunities and can be exploited. Niches do not 
pre-exist, waiting to be occupied; niches instead are created by organizational 
action. Wherever there is environmental "openness" (unfilled ecospace) there is 
opportunistic choice as the engine of chan e. 
But community ecologists are not "kee choicers": existing organizations do 
not change; new organizations must be formed first. 
The open ended character of community ecology views is noted by Astley: 
"Stridly speaking there is only one source of change, namely, organizational 
variation. Environmental selection only stabilizes population f o m  and, in effect, 
retards evolutionary change. . . When selection criteria shift, it is only because 
organizational variations are successful in establishing new populations in which 
competition for scarce resources ensues." (Astley, 1985: 240). 
85. See Evan, 1966; Perrow, 1972; The strength of networks, degree of coupling, 
and role of regulation in shaping organizational behavior is a major theme m this 
literature. See Weick, 1976; alford, 1977; McNeil and Minihan, 1977; Salancik, 
1979; Laumann, 1976. 
86. Dess and Beard, op. cit., 1984. See also Aldrich, op. cit., 1979. 
87. For the most part, the unit of analysis is a population of organizations and the 
findings of this research, strictly speaking, apply to populations, not to 
individual organizations. Nevertheless, the findings of this stream of research have 
relevance for assessing the situation, the history, and likely future of single 
organizations. See Hawley, 1950, for the classic description of human ecology 
concerns. 
88. We constructed a table (below) of some of the leading authors and 
environmental factors. We used this as a guide to observations at SSA. 
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Author 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) 
Tichy (1980) 
Brittain and Freeman 
(1980) 
Table 1 
Environmental Change 
Whetten (1980) 
Rowan (1982) 
Environmental cycles in three 
dimensions: Concentration (power 
and authority); Munificence 
(available resources); 
Connectedness (interaction 
network). These factors 
determine the levels of 
conflict, interdependence, and 
uncertainty in the 
environment 
Environmental cycles 
in technology, politics, culture 
Uncertainty of environments, 
Compatibility of new 
environments 
Grain (finevs. coarse) 
Degree of change 
Economics of organizing 
(entry costs) 
Density of environment 
(ca?yng capacity) 
Environmental munificence 
Organizational Atrophy (success 
breeds failure, organizations 
continue to invoke standard 
procedures despite chan e) 
Vulnerability (liability o f 
newness, and re organization) 
Loss of Legitimacy (problem 
depletion) 
Environmental entropy 
(decline in total environmental 
resources) 
Institutional consensus 
(Major environmental actors 
agree on cqurse of action) 
Hannan and Freeman Ca acity of the environment 
(1977) (a &d capacity of an 
environment to support 
organizations 
Population rate of change 
(a rate of population change 
when enviromentd resources are 
plentiful) 
External constraints 
(laws, regulations,etc.) 
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Source: Authors 
Several articles have explored the role of external legitimacy in determining 
the fate of new organizations. See Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986. They found that 
lack of support from external organizations-- lack of external legitimacy and 
institutional support-- were the largest factor in organizational death. Internal 
factors, such as difficulties of admhstration and organization experienced by new 
organizations, were not powerful. The only exception here was senior management 
change: firing senior management had adaptive value (increased survival). 
89. Aldrich and Marsden, op.cit., 1988. 
90. Dess and Beard, 1984; Mdrich, 1979. 
91. Child (1972) op. cit. was among the first to clearly describe this dimension, which 
has been followed by most other authors. 
92. See Laudon, "Privacy and Federal Databanks," Society, January 1980. 
93. See Barry M. Staw, Lance E. Sandelands, and Jane E. Dutton, ''Threat Rigidity 
Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, vol. 26, 1981. 
94. See William H. Starbuck, Arent Greve, and Bo L.T. Hedberg, "Responding to 
Crises," Journal of Business Administration, vol9., 1978. 
95. For a recent review of this literature see James G. March and Zur Shapira, 
"Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking," Management Science, vol. 33, 
No. 11, November, 1987. See also Amos Tversky and Dame1 Kahneman, "The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science, 211,1981. 
96. See Donald C. Hambrick and Richard A. D'Aveni, "Large Corporation Failures 
as Downward Spirals," Administrative 'Science Quarterly, vol. 33, No. 1, March 
1988. 
97. Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 959. 
98. Forbes Magazine, November 1987. 
99. Nation's Business, 1976. 
100. Starbuck, 1983: 101. On the other hand, Kaufman found that government 
organizations are far more resilient than expected. Of 175 federal government 
organizations in existence in 1923,85% were still alive in 1983; moreover, the 
population of public organizations has grown exponentially in the last 50 years 
Kaufman, 1976). But Kaufman did not account for mergers of a encies into other 
agencies, or change in mission (but retention in name). See &&an, 1976. 
101. Singh, et. al., 1986. 
102. Most businesses in the United States are small (out of 2.2 million corporations, 
89% have assets of less than 1 million dollars). In 1980, about 525,000 new 
businesses were launched, and about 76,000 businesses failed (U.S. Department of 
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Commerce; Statistical Abstract, 1980: Tables 949 and 971). If proprietorships and 
artnerships are included, the percentage of new firms that survive the first year of 
gusiness is around 30%. Studies of new industries like electronics, and especially the 
semi conductor industry, End exceedingly high birth rates, The history of the 
vacuum tube-transistor-integrated circuit industry from 1950-1980 is one of 
continual change in technical and manufacturing leadership, of staid old line 
organizations (WestinPouse, G.E., RCA, Sylvania) being overwhelmed by swarms 
of new comers speciahzing in new techniques suitable for new market niches 
(Fairchild Semiconductor, National Semiconductor, Intel, Motorola) (See Brittain 
and Freemao, 1980). This has led researchers to talk of 'tvaves of organizing over 
time" or cycles of birth (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich, 1979). 
103. Michael L. Tushman, William H. Newman, and Elaine Romanelli, 
"Convergence and Upheaval: Managing the Unsteady Pace of Organizational 
Evolution," Califorma Management Review, vol29, No. 1, 1986. 
104. In prior work there is little opportunity for the environment to act directly on 
the innovation process. In Laudon's model of 1974, to Kraemer and King's model of 
1985, the environment acts indirectly on IT innovation through its influence on 
organizational structure, politics, and values. The possibility that the environment 
can directly effect IT innovation, or so overwhelm organizational features so as to 
make the organizational elements almost incidental, is not considered. 
Prior research on IT innovation has not used any of the environmental 
models with any fidelity. 
Of course environmental variables do appear in other works as well. In 
Laudon (19'74), Kling (1978), Westin (1972), Danziger et. al., (1982), and Kraemer 
et. al. (1981) environmental sources of funds, technology, and support are described. 
But here the environment is seen as little more than a tableau, sometimes 
enabling, sometimes constricting, on which organizational forces act. 
Without denying that environments act through organizations and indirectly 
influence IT innovation, there is anecdotal evidence to support much greater 
research on the role of environments acting directly on IT mnovation. 
105. Laudon, 1986. 
106. Laudon, 1986. 
107. Laudon, 1986; see also the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.. Laudon, 1986; see 
also the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. 
108. Laudon and Laudon, 1988: Chapter 3. 
109. Tushman and Anderson, 1986. See also Mensch. 
110. Scholars tend to resist the idea that environments dominate system 
development and design. But the impact of environmental variables is so strong 
that researchers purposely control out the effects of these environmental factors in 
order to observe and study the operation of political, policy, and other institutional 
factors. 
For instance, Kraemer and King (1985) in their study of computing in OECD and 
American cities found that the environmental variable city size was powerfully 
related to other variables such as computing installation and use, policies, problems, 
and benefits. It was only by eliminating size as a statistical variab e that other 
relationships--much weaker--could be examined (see King and Kraemer, chapter 6). 
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The sheer power of the environmental variable (size) weakens "rational" and 
decisionmaking models. Once size is considered, there is not much variance left 
that political, rational, or other variables can explain. King and Kraemer conclude 
both that "size is not a basic explanatory variable" and "Size is, therefore, a critical 
and underlyin environmental variable that simultaneously creates an impetus and 
regulates the I! ow of resources for the development or lack of development of the 
computing environment" (page 156). 
111. Readers are referred to the very impressive forthcoming volume by Kenneth L. 
Kraemer, John Leslie King, Debora Dunkle, and Joseph P. Lane, Change and 
Control in Computing: Managing the Information Systems Function. Irvine, CA: 
Public Policy Research Organization, University of California, 1987 (xerox). This is 
a superb longitudinal study of computing in seven local governments. The theory 
developed in the first chapter is parallel with our own model proposed in this paper. 
The author is indebted to Ken Kraemer and John King for our many discussions 
about theory and empirical research over many years. 
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